Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands

dc.contributor.authorKarakostas, G.en
dc.contributor.authorKolliopoulos, S. G.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:23:08Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:23:08Z
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/12702
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectoptimal traffic assignmenten
dc.subjectequilibriumen
dc.subjectmulticlassen
dc.titleEdge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demandsen
heal.abstractWe examine how to induce selfish heterogeneous users in a multicommodity network to reach an equilibrium that minimizes the social cost. In the absence of centralized coordination, we use the classical method of imposing appropriate taxes (tolls) on the edges of the network. We significantly generalize previous work [20,13,9] by allowing user demands to be elastic. In this setting the demand of a user is not fixed a priori but it is a function of the routing cost experienced, a most natural assumption in traffic and data networks.en
heal.accesscampus-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
heal.identifier.secondary<Go to ISI>://000240077300005-
heal.journalNameComputing and Combinatorics, Proceedingsen
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.languageen-
heal.publicationDate2006-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Μαθηματικώνel
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.type.enJournal articleen

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