Η θεωρία του Πλάτωνα για τη γνώση ως ανάμνηση υπό το πρίσμα του κοινωνικοπολιτικού και γνωσιοθεωρητικού του οπτιμισμού
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Τσολερίδης, Ματθαίος Χ.
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Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Φιλοσοφική Σχολή. Τμήμα Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγωγικής και Ψυχολογίας
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The aim of this Master Thesis is the exploration of the platonic theory of knowledge as recollection, under the prism of a more general socio-political optimism that characterizes Plato’s thought.
The Introduction includes an attempt to argue that Plato has a spirit of optimism concerning the possibility of improving the sociopolitical situation and the possession and promulgation of true knowledge.
In the First Chapter I make an analytical presentation of the theory of recollection, as it is firstly presented in the Meno. The emphasis is on the so called eristic or sophistic “paradox of knowledge”, which Socrates attempts to answer, by developing the theory of knowledge as recollection, but without connecting this theory, in this particular dialogue, with the theory of Ideas, which, as it seems, Plato had not yet fully developed. There is also emphasis on the aspects of the theory of recollection that refer to the preexistence and the immortality of the soul. I also describe the practical application of this theory, where a young slave, who has no knowledge of geometry, through Socrates’ relevant questions, solves a geometrical problem.
In the Second Chapter I fully present the theory of knowledge as recollection, as it is developed in the platonic dialogue Phaedo. It is noted that in Phaedo Plato formulates for the first time the theory of Ideas, connecting it to the theory of the immortality of the soul and the theory of knowledge as recollection. It is also stressed that the theory of the immortality of the soul could not stand on its own without the theory of recollection and the theory of Ideas, since the immortality of the soul is based on the relevance of the soul to the truly beings [ὄντως ὄντα], which are eternal and imperishable. The proof for the immortality of the soul, which is the basic aim of this dialogue, is based on three arguments, one of which is the argument of recollection.
In the Third Chapter I note that in the Phaedrus Plato sketches briefly the issue of recollection in the frame of the myth of the soul, because, as it seems, Plato considers it well known. There is also an in depth reference to the myth of the soul, which clearly states that all human souls, before being embodied, had been acquainted with and had grasped the truth of the world of Ideas, in one degree or the other. The perceivable beauty and love, which comes from the beauty of the soul, are the starting point of the intellectual procedure of recollection, which drives the philosopher’s soul to a new conception of the idea of beauty.
In the Fourth Chapter I claim that in the Symposium, the Republic and the Philebus there is only a hint to the theory of recollection. In the Symposium the theory of knowledge as recollection must be assumed in the erotic degrees of Diotima. In the Republic the theory of recollection seems to be hinted in the three allegories, by which Plato attempts, through the use of images and analogies, to illuminate the world of Ideas, and in particular the idea of the Good. The theory of recollection is also hinted in the passage 518 b-c, which says that the soul has an inherent power and means to learn. Finally, in the Philebus, the recollection, which is mentioned in the frame of Plato’s views on the pleasures of expectation, does not seem to have a metaphysical aspect. We could find a trace though of the theory of recollection in 34 b10-13, which says that it is possible to talk about recollection when the soul “in itself” contemplates things, which it once felt or learned, but later forgot. Furthermore, the passage 58 a, which refers that the soul has an inherent power to love the truth and make any attempt to reach it, could be seen as another hint to the theory of recollection.
Next, I point to the differences and the similarities of the theory of recollection in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus. The differences reveal that Plato’s thought is dynamic and non static, while the similarities show that there are views to which Plato remains faithful to and which assign unity to his thought.
The overall claims of this Thesis could lead to the conclusion that Plato’s thought, concerning the theory of knowledge as recollection, changes between his former and latter writing period. In the Meno, Plato presents an experimental sketch of this theoretical conception, connecting it only to the theory of the immortality of the soul. Later, in the Phaedo, Plato integrates the theory of recollection to a broader theoretical construction, in which the theory of Ideas has a preeminent position. Finally, in the Phaedrus, with the power of Plato’s poetic imagination, Plato masterly entwines the theory of Ideas and recollection and immortality of the soul into the great myth of the soul, claiming, at the same time, that “the soul of every human being has seen reality” (249 e), a view that grounds the universal power of the ability for recollection and is the highest formulation of gnosiotheoretic optimism.
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Πλάτων, Ανάμνηση, Γνωσιοθεωρία, Οπτιμισμός, Plato, Recollection, Theory of knowledge, Optimism
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Πλάτων, 429 π.Χ.-347 π.Χ., Γνωσιοθεωρία, Αισιοδοξία
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Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Φιλοσοφική Σχολή. Τμήμα Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγωγικής και Ψυχολογίας
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Σολωμού-Παπανικολάου, Βασιλική Π.
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Σολωμού-Παπανικολάου, Βασιλική Π.
Πέτσιος, Κωνσταντίνος Θ.
Καραμπατζάκη, Ελένη Α.
Πέτσιος, Κωνσταντίνος Θ.
Καραμπατζάκη, Ελένη Α.
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Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Φιλοσοφική Σχολή. Τμήμα Φιλοσοφίας, Παιδαγωγικής και Ψυχολογίας
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Βιβλιογράφία : σ. 104-120
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123 σ.