Self containment: archieving peace in Anarchic settings

dc.contributor.authorAdam, A.en
dc.contributor.authorSekeris, P.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:05:38Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:05:38Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11353
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectConflicten
dc.subjectPrivate Informationen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.titleSelf containment: archieving peace in Anarchic settingsen
heal.abstractIn anarchic settings, the potential rivals are dragged in an arms race that can degenerate in an open war out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We allow the players to decentralize the two core decisions that determine whether peace or war ensues. While in centralized countries the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, where the two decisions are dissociated there exists scope for not arming with certainty, and hence overcoming the commitment problem that makes war otherwise inevitable. Using data on the 1975-2001 period, we provide evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military o cers, the likelihood of observing an international conflict is higher.en
heal.accesscampus-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
heal.journalNameCRED Working papersen
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.languageen-
heal.publicationDate2010-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημώνel
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.type.enJournal articleen

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