Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes

dc.contributor.authorAdam, A.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:04:20Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:04:20Z
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829-
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11161
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectmilitary conscriptionen
dc.subjectdemocracyen
dc.subjectdemocratic consolidationen
dc.subjectspecificationen
dc.subjecteconometricsen
dc.subjectbureaucratsen
dc.titleMilitary conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimesen
heal.abstractPrevious studies on the determinants of military conscription have found no association between the level of democracy and conscription. This paper argues that the stability of democratic institutions, rather than the current level of democracy, affects the decision to raise a conscript army. We hypothesize that countries with unstable democratic institutions employ military conscription as a mechanism to control the military and to prevent its involvement in a successful coup. By using data on 149 countries for the years 1970 to 2005, we find that countries with long-standing democratic traditions are less likely to use conscription, corroborating our hypothesis. Our results are robust to variations in specifications.en
heal.accesscampus-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
heal.identifier.primaryDOI 10.1007/s11127-010-9725-3-
heal.identifier.secondary<Go to ISI>://000297817800017-
heal.identifier.secondaryhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/6410622292344027/fulltext.pdf-
heal.journalNamePublic Choiceen
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.languageen-
heal.publicationDate2012-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημώνel
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.type.enJournal articleen

Αρχεία

Φάκελος/Πακέτο αδειών

Προβολή: 1 - 1 of 1
Φόρτωση...
Μικρογραφία εικόνας
Ονομα:
license.txt
Μέγεθος:
1.74 KB
Μορφότυπο:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Περιγραφή: