Strategic Environmental Policies under Public Good Provision
dc.contributor.author | Tsakiris, N. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Michael, M. S. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Hatzipanayotou, P. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-11-24T17:05:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-11-24T17:05:36Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11349 | |
dc.rights | Default Licence | - |
dc.subject | Cross-border Pollution | en |
dc.subject | Strategic Environmental Policy | en |
dc.subject | Public Abatement | en |
dc.title | Strategic Environmental Policies under Public Good Provision | en |
heal.abstract | In this paper it is examined the importance of public finance to the ranking in terms of environmental quality, of three environmental policy instruments: emission taxes, emission permits, and emission quotas. The set-up is a general equilibrium, two large open economies model with production generated cross-border pollution, private and pubic pollution abatement. Within this model, we show that when both countries use environmental taxes strategically, and the tax revenues are used to finance public abatement activities instead of lump-sum distributed, then non-cooperative emission tax setting does not induce " a race to the bottom" . Moreover, in the case of emission permits and when their revenues finance public abatement, then strategic choice of emission permits leads both countries to " a race to the top" . | en |
heal.access | campus | - |
heal.fullTextAvailability | TRUE | - |
heal.journalType | peer reviewed | - |
heal.language | en | - |
heal.publicationDate | 2011 | - |
heal.recordProvider | Πανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών | el |
heal.type | journalArticle | - |
heal.type.el | Άρθρο Περιοδικού | el |
heal.type.en | Journal article | en |
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