Equilibria for networks with malicious users

dc.contributor.authorKarakostas, G.en
dc.contributor.authorViglas, A.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:23:17Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:23:17Z
dc.identifier.issn0025-5610-
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/12725
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectselfish routingen
dc.subjectmalicious useren
dc.subjectequilibriumen
dc.subjectsaddle pointen
dc.titleEquilibria for networks with malicious usersen
heal.abstractWe consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behavior. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to the overall cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.en
heal.accesscampus-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
heal.identifier.primaryDOI 10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2-
heal.identifier.secondary<Go to ISI>://000247387100007-
heal.identifier.secondaryhttp://download.springer.com/static/pdf/425/art%253A10.1007%252Fs10107-006-0015-2.pdf?auth66=1390992028_f7f3c9d6c5bb9499400438a13e6074dd&ext=.pdf-
heal.journalNameMathematical Programmingen
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.languageen-
heal.publicationDate2007-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Θετικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Μαθηματικώνel
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.type.enJournal articleen

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