A politico-economic analysis of minimum wages and wage subsidies

dc.contributor.authorAdam, A.en
dc.contributor.authorMoutos, T.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T17:05:15Z
dc.date.available2015-11-24T17:05:15Z
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765-
dc.identifier.urihttps://olympias.lib.uoi.gr/jspui/handle/123456789/11289
dc.rightsDefault Licence-
dc.subjectminimum wagesen
dc.subjectwage subsidiesen
dc.subjectmajority votingen
dc.subjectpolitical economyen
dc.titleA politico-economic analysis of minimum wages and wage subsidiesen
heal.abstractThis paper constructs a political economy model in which minimum wages are determined according to majority voting. Using the minimum wage scheme as the status quo, we show that the replacement of minimum wages by wage subsidies is not likely to receive political support unless it is supplemented by increased taxation of profits (after-tax profits are also likely to increase). (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en
heal.accesscampus-
heal.fullTextAvailabilityTRUE-
heal.identifier.primaryDOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.029-
heal.identifier.secondary<Go to ISI>://000288404800001-
heal.identifier.secondaryhttp://ac.els-cdn.com/S0165176510004027/1-s2.0-S0165176510004027-main.pdf?_tid=546a805db5178ef46a053fbff4ab0b53&acdnat=1332929492_374ecb0becdd533822fff454d903301d-
heal.journalNameEconomics Lettersen
heal.journalTypepeer reviewed-
heal.languageen-
heal.publicationDate2011-
heal.recordProviderΠανεπιστήμιο Ιωαννίνων. Σχολή Οικονομικών και Κοινωνικών Επιστημών. Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημώνel
heal.typejournalArticle-
heal.type.elΆρθρο Περιοδικούel
heal.type.enJournal articleen

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